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Among alternatives to adjudication, mediation is arguably even
more alternative than arbitration. At least the process differs more:
while arbitration offers a different type of neutral decisionmaker, me-
diation takes decisionmaking entirely out of the hands of a neutral
decisionmaker and vests it in the parties. The meaning of the term
"alternative" becomes blurred, however, in that mediation is inter-
twined with adjudication as a means of settling litigation. Mediation's
role in settlement means it will be an important part of the procedural
world of the future. So, although the subtitle of this symposium refers
only to decisional models of resolution-adjudication and arbitra-
tion-this paper focuses on the development of a rule system for
mediation.
Some procedural rules for mediation, such as those associated
with court-sponsored programs, were created directly for the use of
mediation within the adversary system. Other rules apply to media-
tions generally or were designed for mediation programs with no di-
rect connection to the courts. Both types of rules are linked to the
adjudication system, however, in that many of their provisions govern
how a mediation will be treated in later litigation. As a result, the
growth of mediation procedure is important not only for developing
mediation, but also for defining the relationship between mediation
and litigation.
* Professor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law. This Essay is
based on a presentation at a joint session of the Dispute Resolution and Civil
Procedure Sections at the AALS Annual Meeting, January 3, 2004, on the topic
"Competing or Complementary Rule Systems? Adjudication, Arbitration, and the
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and research contributions by Kristen Blankley and David Warren.
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This Essay begins with one person's experience of the ongoing
changes in the relationship of litigation and mediation, changes that
are both reflected in and stimulated by procedure. The acceptance of
mediation by "litigators" is part of a transformation in how lawyers
think of the way they approach civil disputes. While it has been true
for many decades that a significant proportion of court cases end in
settlement,' the profession's emphasis on settlement and on methods
of settlement has intensified in recent years. 2 As court procedures in-
creasingly interweave mediation with litigation, lawyers increasingly as-
sociate mediation with the court system as a useful settlement
process.3 Mediation also has its own identity, however, as a process
with broader application and a history separate from civil litigation. 4
Thus as developments in mediation and litigation continue, they
evolve both individually and together.
1 Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle:Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339 (1994).
2 See, e.g., The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, 69 JUDICATURE 257
(1986); Marc Galanter, ".... A Settlement Judge, Not a Trial Judge": Judicial Mediation in
the United States, 12 J.L. Soc'y 1 (1985); Hope Viner Sanborn, The Vanishing Trial,
A.B.A.J., Oct. 1, 2002, at 24.
Some scholars blame the strengthened focus on settlement for what they have
identified as the rise of an attitude that views trial as a failure. See, e.g.,Judith Resnik,
Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 HARv. L.
REV. 925, 925-26 (2000). Yet, while trials have declined at an accelerated pace in
recent years, with the absolute number of trials in federal courts declining as well as
the proportion of cases ending in trial, Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Exami-
nation of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.
459, 461 (2004), this trend may be due more to an increase in summary dispositions
than in settlements, Gillian K. Hadfield, Where Have All the Trials Gone? Settlements,
Nontrial Adjudications, and Statistical Artifacts in the Changing Disposition of Federal Cases,
IJ. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 705, 711-12 (2004).
3 See Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It's Here to Stay and
Much Better Than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 200-01 & n.32 (2003) (reviewing data and
stating: "I think I could achieve judgment as a matter of law at this point on the
proposition that mediation is now an essential element of American civil litigation").
4 For discussions of historical perspectives on the development of mediation and
mediation objectives, see, for example, JAMESJ. ALFINI ET AL., MEDIATION THEORY AND
PRACrICE 1-33 (2001); SARAH R. COLE ET AL., MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY & PRACTICE
§§ 5:1-4 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2003); WALTER A. MAGGIOLO, TECHNIQUES OF MEDIA-
TION 12-15, 19-26, 55-71 (1985); R.A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution-The Domestic
Arena: A Survey of Methods, Applications and Critical Issues, in BEYOND CONFRONTATION:
LEARNING CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA 9, 13-16 (John A. Vas-
quez et al. eds., 1995); Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165,
170-73 (2003).
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The Essay then examines several examples of one important ele-
ment in that evolution: the creation of procedures to establish and
encourage mediation in the civil litigation setting. Developing a legal
structure to support mediation should not be solely a matter of select-
ing procedures that will promote it as a means of settlement. Even in
a litigation system whose structure reveals a "preference for private
ordering, '5 and whose rules establish a "clear policy of favoring settle-
ment of all lawsuits,"'6 there are other important considerations. Ac-
cessible justice, open court proceedings, effective enunciation of
rights, consistent outcomes, and the fundamental rule of law are val-
ues that must not be ignored in a single-minded effort to encourage
mediation. 7
Of equal concern to many is preserving the principles at the
heart of mediation. Dispute resolution scholars worry that core values
such as party self-determination, voluntariness, and mediator neutral-
ity are threatened as mediation increasingly becomes an established
part of the litigation system.8 The way in which court-connected me-
diation programs are structured can make a significant difference in
the degree to which mediation values are carried over into the litiga-
tion setting.9 In developing procedures for the world of the future we
need to recognize explicitly the values associated with the traditions of
5 Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try: Civil Jury Verdicts in a System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 4 (1996).
6 Marek v. Chesney, 473 U.S. 1, 10 (1985).
7 A strong body of scholarship examines how the growth of alternative dispute
resolution and a culture of settlement can endanger important goals and characteris-
tics of our justice system. See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution:
Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARV. L. REV. 668 (1986); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Hensler, supra note 4; David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of
the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995); Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors?
Alternative Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 211
(1995). But see Subrin, supra note 3, at 218-25 (responding to critiques).
8 There is extensive literature examining the changes in mediation practices and
values associated with its use in the adversary system. See, e.g.,JamesJ. Alfini, Trashing
Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
47 (1991); John Lande, How Will Lauyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each
Other?. 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 839 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in Alternative
Dispute Resolution: New Issues, No Answers from the Adversary Conception of Lawyers' Respon-
sibilities, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 407 (1997); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in
an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or "The Law of ADR, "19 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1 (1991); Sharon Press, Institutionalization: Savior or Saboteur of Mediation ?, 24 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 903 (1997); Nancy A. Welsh, The Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in
Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of Institutionalization, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REv. 1 (2001).
9 See generally DorothyJ. Della Noce et al., Assimilative, Autonomous, or Synergistic
Visions: How Mediation Programs in Florida Address the Dilemma of Court Connection, 3
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
both litigation and mediation and identify the tensions among those
values. Then the difficult task is to find the best balance. 10
To illustrate such tensions and how they have been resolved in
recent procedural developments, this paper discusses two law initia-
tives at the interface between mediation and litigation. First, the Uni-
form Mediation Act (UMA) was adopted by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Law (NCCUSL) in 2001 and ap-
proved by the American Bar Association (ABA) in 2002 to provide
procedures to protect the confidentiality of mediations in subsequent
litigation. 1 Second, the United Nations Commission on Interna-
tional Trade Law (UNCITRAL) developed the Model Law on Interna-
tional Commercial Conciliation (Model Law),12 which was
recommended by the United Nations for adoption by member states
in 2002.13 The NCCUSL then revisited the UMA and extended its
confidentiality protections into the international commercial media-
tion arena by adding the Model Law as an amendment.'
4
Finally, the Essay looks to the future and examines conflicts over
the values at stake in establishing a procedure for enforcing mediated
agreements, which has the potential to become the next major issue
in the development of a legal framework for mediation. The extent to
which developing the UMA and the Model Law involved compromis-
ing and balancing both mediation and adjudication values argues for
great sensitivity in considering whether to establish procedures for
summary enforcement of mediated agreements.
PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J. 11 (2002) (examining different court-connected mediation
programs in light of a "value-based" dilemma).
10 See, e.g., Alfini, supra note 8, at 75 (asking "[h]ow the goals and demands of a
consensual, nonadversarial process can be reconciled with those of [a] highly adver-
sarial context").
11 The text of the UMA and the accompanying reporters' notes are available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm, or through the NC-
CUSL website at http://www.nccusl.org.
12 See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT'L COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Report of the
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on Its Thirty-Fifth Session, U.N.
GAOR, 57th Sess., Supp. No. 17, Annex 1, at 54, U.N. Doc. A/57/17 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter MODEL LAW]. The text of the Model Law is available online through the UNCI-
TRAL web site, at http://www.uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-conc-e.pdf.
See also Draft Guide to Enactment and Use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Conciliation, U.N. Commission on International Trade Law, 35th Sess., at 1,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/514 (2002) [hereinafter Model Law Draft Guide], available at http:/
/www.uncitral.org/english/sessions/unc/unc-35/514e.pdf.
13 Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation of the United Nations Commis-
sion on International Trade Law, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., 52d plen. mtg., Agenda Item
155, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/18 (2002).
14 UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 11 (2003).
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I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS AND CHANGING APPROACHES
TO DISPUTES
As litigation, mediation, and the relationship between the two
evolve, so do the attitudes of lawyers. Although there are undoubtedly
still litigators who regard mediation as an abandonment of zealous
advocacy or an admission that a case is weak, current patterns of alter-
native dispute resolution (ADR) use suggest that this strictly adver-
sarial view is no longer the norm. 15 It seems fair to say that lawyers
increasingly regard litigation and mediation as complementary
processes.
My own growth in conceptualizing the relationship between liti-
gation and mediation tracks, I believe, more general shifts in lawyers'
perceptions of their roles. When I was in law school, we learned that
lawyers litigate when their clients have disputes and that a judicial de-
cision is the culmination of the process. 16 The professors may have
been trying to teach us something more, or something more nuanced,
but that is what I learned. I recall discussions about the shortcomings
of litigation, but none that examined settlement or resolution models
that did not feature adjudication as the endpoint.
In practicing law, I learned that lawyers not only litigate for cli-
ents with disputes, but also negotiate and mediate. Almost all of my
cases settled at some point during the litigation process. I gradually
realized that our clients were often better served by an agreement
charting a course for future dealings than by a court-imposed remedy.
As a "litigator," my initial activity in a case was primarily a traditional,
narrowly defined version of litigation. But as the case progressed, set-
tlement became the central litigation effort. Even when I thought I
was focused entirely on classic litigation, the question in the back-
ground was always: "How far will this case need to go before the par-
ties can find common ground for an agreement?" In this way,
negotiation, mediation, and other settlement procedures were an in-
tegral part of the litigation process.
Judicial decisions-even procedural ones-were helpful because
they narrowed the issues and allowed the lawyers better to envision
15 See Roselle L. Wissler, Barriers to Attorneys'Discussion and Use of ADR, 19 OHIo
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 459, 484 (2004) (reporting that more than half of the Arizona
trial attorneys answering a 2001 survey thought other attorneys would not view a pro-
posal to use ADR as a sign of weakness compared to thirteen percent who thought it
would be seen as a weakness).
16 This characterization was, of course, the product of earlier alterations in per-
ception. For example, during the 1970s there was a transition in lawyers' description
of themselves from "trial lawyer" to "litigator." John F. Grady, Trial Lawyers, Litigators
and Clients' Costs, LITIG., Spring 1978, at 5, 5-6.
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the eventual court outcome. But in most cases no one contemplated
that a court would have the final say. From a traditional litigation
standpoint, the decisions were punctuation marks indicating progress
toward a final judgment in the case. But, in actuality, their chief func-
tion was to focus and inform negotiations.1 7 We were dedicated to
"winning" these decisions, of course, and a win often translated into a
more favorable negotiating position. Whether they were positive or
negative for our client, however, these judicial decisions were prima-
rily significant because they supplied a sharper definition of the issues
that could create movement toward settlement. Not only was settle-
ment an integral part of litigation, but adjudication was an important
aspect of the settlement process.
Now, in examples my students bring to dispute resolution classes
from their law firm work, I see suggestions of a further change in law-
yers' conceptualizations. Some lawyers are beginning to see media-
tion as a separate, independent process as well as a component of
litigation. Students speak of disputes in which litigation is not as-
sumed, or even presumed, to be the process of choice. There are
lawyers who view litigation and mediation as different but compatible
tools for dispute resolution and who select or combine these tools ac-
cording to the goals and circumstances of the situation. They may
choose to file suit because they seek an adjudication.1 8 They may al-
17 Because much of my work involved cases before the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, the route to a final court decision involved more layers than a typical
court case: an Administrative LawJudge made an initial decision, which was appealed
to the Commission and eventually reviewed by the federal court of appeals. The rela-
tionship I describe between these decisions and settlement was perhaps more striking
and thus more readily observed in an agency setting, but it was not different in kind
from my experience in federal district court litigation.
18 There will always be a need to resolve disputes through public adjudication.
First, when there is a need to establish rights or create precedent, settlement is func-
tionally inadequate. See Fiss, supra note 7, at 1085. Settlements carry no formal
weight in later judicial decisions and produce no rules that are binding on nonpar-
ties. The value of precedent in guiding future conduct and creating certainty in ex-
pectations is thus lost. SeeJules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, Soc.
PHIL. & POL'Y, Autumn 1986, at 102, 114-19. Public settlement agreements could
conceivably affect the direction of the law through the force of an effective example,
but confidential settlements do not offer even this contribution to the development
of law. SeeJudith Resnik, Whose Judgrment? Vacating Judgments, Preferences for Settlement
and the Role of Adjudication at the Close of the Twentieth Century, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1471,
1493-95 & n.90 (1994) (observing that there is no third-party right of access to settle-
ments in court-sponsored ADR programs and that confidentiality of settlement agree-
ments is permitted as a means of encouraging settlement).
Second, disputes are better suited to litigation than mediation when they involve
matters of strongly held principle or conscience that the parties do not want to com-
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ternatively desire an agreed resolution of the dispute. In the latter
situation they might choose to file suit as part of a strategy for moving
toward a settlement of the litigation. Or, they might choose another
process, such as mediation, in the first instance. These options offer a
broader way of envisioning how a lawyer can help a client with a dis-
pute than a strict litigation model, even one with settlement incorpo-
rated as the endpoint of litigation. There is a subtle, but real,
difference between treating litigation as if it will usually end in settle-
ment and choosing instead to shape litigation, if one pursues it at all,
entirely in the service of reaching a favorable agreed resolution.
One way to encapsulate the direction of this change is to say that
these lawyers' new attitudes place primary emphasis on resolving a dis-
pute rather than on settling litigation of a dispute. In a recent article,
Professor Peter N. Thompson asks: "Is mediation a step in the adver-
sary process or an alternative approach to resolving disputes?" 19 My
answer, admittedly based only on anecdotes, is: "To a growing extent,
both." Law schools now teach students to look beyond winning a law-
suit in serving their clients, and my students' reports suggest that they
are conscious of a form of lawyering with rich choices in addition to
litigation. I certainly do not mean to indicate that this approach is
commonplace for the typical lawyer, 20 but the observations do hint
that this change in the relationship between litigation and mediation
may be emerging.
These conceptual developments have been inextricably linked to
procedural developments. Our system of civil litigation and its rules
have both mirrored and shaped the changing relationship between
litigation and settlement. Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure reflected litigation developments, as it developed from a pretrial
rule that did not facially contemplate settlement at all into a rule that
institutionalizes settlement conferences and "special procedures to as-
promise. See Frank E.A. Sander & Steven B. Goldberg, Fitting the Forum to the Fuss: A
User-Friendly Guide to Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEGOT. J. 49, 57 (1994).
Finally, settlement is also extremely difficult in cases characterized by the 'jack-
pot" syndrome-when the plaintiff expects a large recovery in excess of his damages,
but the defendant disagrees about this likelihood. Id. at 59; see alsoJeanne M. Brett et
al., The Effectiveness of Mediation: An Independent Analysis of Cases Handled by Four Major
Service Providers, 12 NEGOT.J. 259, 267 (1996) (reporting that cases in which one party
had a potential for a large recovery or had decided that settlement was not in its
financial interest were typically the cases that did not settle).
19 Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected Mediation-
Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of Public Ad-
versarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 509, 516 (2004).
20 Many students still describe their experience of mediation in a law firm as, "we
showed up, we shut up, we left," especially when the mediation was court-ordered.
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sist in resolving the dispute." 21 Pursuant to procedural changes en-
acted by Congress, many federal courts developed ADR programs in
the early 1990S,22 and federal district courts are now mandated by stat-
ute to provide these offerings. 23 By the mid-1990s, every state had one
or more court-connected mediation programs. 24 Thus, early changes
made ADR processes available within litigation structures. In a paral-
lel development, most law schools made special ADR courses available
as part of their procedural offerings. 25
With many mediation programs now available, procedural devel-
opments within the litigation system continue to change the climate
and more fully integrate the use of ADR processes in practical terms.
Some courts combine litigation and resolution processes through pro-
cedures such as court referral 26 or requirements that counsel discuss
21 FED. R. Crv. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(9). Amendments to the rule in 1983 "recog-
nize[d] that it ha[d] become commonplace to discuss settlement at pretrial confer-
ences." FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note to the 1983 amendment. In
1993, the rule was further revised to more accurately reflect "the various procedures
that, in addition to traditional settlement conferences, may be helpful in settling liti-
gation." FED. R. Civ. P. 16 advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendment; see
David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U.
PA. L. REv. 1969, 1986-87 (1989) (pointing out that the 1983 amendments explicitly
authorized preexisting judicial settlement activity).
22 Federal programs were initially established as elements of district courts' local
expense and delay plans under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 471-482 (2000). By 1996, over half the district courts offered mediation. ELIZA-
BETH PLAPINGER & DONNA STIENSTRA, ADR AND SETTLEMENT IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT
COURTS 4 (1996). The federal courts of appeals developed active mediation programs
in each circuit under the authority of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, which
authorizes settlement conferences. See generally ROBERT J. NIEMIC, MEDIATION AND
CONFERENCE PROGRAMS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS: A SOURCEBOOK (1997)
(discussing different ADR programs in federal courts).
23 Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C. § 652(a) (2000).
24 JUDITH FILNER ET AL., CONFLICT RESOLUTION INSTITUTE FOR COURTS, 1995: COM-
PENDIUM OF STATE COURT RESOURCES MATERIALS 8-10 (1995), cited in Roselle L. Wiss-
ler, When Does Familiarity Breed Content? A Study of the Role of Different Forms of ADR
Education and Experience in Attorneys' ADR Recommendations, 2 PEPP. Disp. RESOL. L.J.
199, 200 (2002).
25 SeeJean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating Civil Procedure and ADR
in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 681, 684 n.12 (2005).
26 For example, the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 permits judges to
require federal litigants to mediate. 28 U.S.C. § 652(a). The Northern District of
California is one court that exercises this authority as part of a multi-option program.
See N.D. CAL. ADR LOCAL R. 2-3. In Florida, courts must refer certain cases to media-
tion on the motion of one of the parties and may refer them otherwise. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 44.102(2) (West 2003). In Missouri, courts have authority to order litigants to
an ADR process, although parties may opt out of the referral if they conclude that the
process "has no reasonable chance of being productive." Mo. Sup. CT. R. 17.03.
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ADR with clients.2 7 These procedures-which expose attorneys to
mediation in referred cases or require them to consider mediation as
part of their normal litigation planning-are thought to have helped
some local legal cultures shift toward increased, and earlier, use of
mediation. 28 For example, in Ottawa, Canada, a rule that requires the
parties (both lawyers and clients) to attend mediation 29 is associated
with earlier review of case files for settlement, greater client participa-
tion in litigation, changes in settlement strategies and behaviors, and
an increased acceptance of mediation.30 These changes could be in-
terpreted as signs of some convergence between mediation and litiga-
tion.31 Evidence of such integration remains patchy, however,3 2 and is
as yet rarely reflected in the structure of most law school curricula.
33
27 See, e.g., MINN. GEN. R. PRAC. 114.
28 See, e.g., Bobbi McAdoo, A Report to the Minnesota Supreme Court: The Impact of
Rule 114 on Civil Litigation Practice in Minnesota, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 403, 416-19
(2002) (reporting a large increase in mediation under a "mandatory consideration"
rule, with more than ninety percent of metropolitan respondents predicting they
would continue to use mediation if the rule were repealed); Nancy H. Rogers & Craig
A. McEwen, Employing the Law to Increase the Use of Mediation and to Encourage Direct and
Early Negotiations, 13 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 831, 842 (1998) (reporting that expe-
rience attending mediation sessions helped overcome resistance to mediation); Wiss-
ler, supra note 24, at 225-27 (finding that experience using a specific ADR process as
counsel was the most important factor distinguishing attorneys who did or did not
recommend that process to clients). But see Bobbi McAdoo & Art Hinshaw, The Chal-
lenge of Institutionalizing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Attorney Perspectives on the Effect of
Rule 17 on Civil Litigation in Missouri, 67 Mo. L. REv. 473, 528-29 (2002) (reporting
that a new rule authorizing judicial referral and requiring lawyers to discuss ADR with
clients led to an increased, but still low, rate of mediation participation).
29 Ontario Rule of Civil Procedure 24.1 establishes an "opt-out" model of
mandatory mediation that requires an application in person for an exemption. Medi-
ations are held early, usually before discovery begins, and lawyers must bring their
clients. Julie MacFarlane, Culture Change? A Tale of Two Cities and Mandatory Court-
Connected Mediation, 2002 J. Disp. RESOL. 241, 244.
30 Id. at 288-301.
31 Id. at 310-11.
32 For example, several studies have found that lawyers who report they favor the
use of mediation do not necessarily use it regularly or recommend it to clients. See
John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5
HARV. NEGOT. L. REv. 137, 218 & n.233 (2000); Morris L. Medley &James A. Schellen-
berg, Attitudes of Attorneys Toward Mediation, 12 MEDIATION Q. 185, 194-95 (1994);
Rogers & McEwen, supra note 28, at 841; see also Joshua D. Rosenberg & H. Jay
Folberg, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Empirical Analysis, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1487,
1487 (1994) (reporting a similar finding for early neutral evaluation).
33 For the most part, civil procedure remains a civil litigation course with a small
section of the casebook acknowledging the prevalence of settlement. See Sternlight,
supra note 25, at 682 n.8.
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To the extent that integration is taking place, it is perhaps inevita-
ble that tensions between mediation and litigation values will emerge.
The following sections explore how recent procedural developments
have resolved some of those competing values.
II. THE UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT
The UMA is a major milestone in the development of procedures
to make mediation more effective within, and as a complement to,
litigation. It governs both court-connected mediations and media-
tions conducted pursuant to an agreement by the parties. 34 Consis-
tent with this broad scope, the Act is limited to topics that do not need
tailoring to the circumstances of a specific mediation program or spe-
cific legal context for a mediation.35 Primarily, the Act establishes
procedures for protecting the confidentiality of statements made in
the mediation process. 36 It delineates boundaries between privileged
communications and those that need to be disclosed to protect "spe-
cific and compelling societal interests."37 In doing so, the Act strikes a
balance between the encouragement of effective mediation and the
fundamental adjudication value of "every [person's] evidence. ' 38 The
Act also seeks to support fairness in mediation by respecting core me-
diation values, which it identifies as the parties' exercise of self-deter-
mination and the impartiality of the mediator.3 9
34 There are several distinctive types of mediations that are not covered by the
Act. In general terms, these include collective bargaining mediations, judicial settle-
ment conferences, student peer mediations, and mediations within correctional insti-
tutions for youths. See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 3(b) (2003).
35 Id. § 3(a), (c); id. prefatory note § 6.
36 Id. prefatory note § 6; Michael B. Getty, The Process of Drafting the Uniforn Medi-
ation Act, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 157, 160 (2002).
37 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note.
38 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2192, at 70
(1961).
39 See UNIF. MEDIATION ACT prefatory note §§ 1-2. For a discussion of core medi-
ation values, see Joseph B. Stulberg, Fairness and Mediation, 13 OHIo ST. J. ON Disp.
RESOL. 909, 910-16 (1998); Welsh, supra note 8, at 3, 15-20. The Act seeks to pro-
mote these values by selecting a privilege that can be waived as the mechanism to
protect confidentiality, UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 5, and by adopting provisions that
limit mediator reports and testimony, id. §§ 6(c), 7. The Act contemplates that par-
ties may agree to opt out of the privilege or to maintain confidentiality outside of
legal proceedings, id. § 3(c), requires mediators to disclose conflicts of interest and,
when asked, their qualifications, id. § 9(a)-(c), and allows parties to have counsel or
another support person accompany them in the mediation, id. § 10.
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A. The Importance of Confidentiality
First, a few words are necessary on why legal protection of confi-
dentiality is important to the development and effective use of media-
tion. In settlement mediation, exchange of information is an
important aspect of the process as parties work toward reaching a con-
sensual agreement. 40 Sharing their interests, needs and priorities with
the other side, or at least with the mediator, can help the parties reach
an agreement. 41 Such information is important if the parties are to
trade their priorities in search of an integrative agreement. 42 It be-
comes crucial if the agreement is to be a "creative" response to the
dispute that goes beyond the scope of the remedy offered in court. In
short, parties who are more candid and forthcoming are thought to
be more likely to maximize the potential benefit of their agreement.
Encouraging a party to reveal information is more challenging in
mediation than in other situations where the law protects communica-
tions, such as exchanges between attorneys and their clients. Rather
than sharing information with a trusted advocate who has the party's
best interests in mind, in mediation a party shares information di-
rectly or indirectly with the other disputant, who is an opponent, and
may well be a hostile opponent.43 Within the mediation process, a
mediator offers protection against harmful use of information by
guarding confidences a party reveals to her in a caucus unless she has
permission to share them with the other side. A mediator does not,
40 Mediation is not limited to seeking an agreement. Transformative mediation,
for example, emphasizes empowerment and an improvement in the disputants' rela-
tionship. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIA-
TION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 102-04
(1994) (noting the same). But an agreement is the desired goal in much mediation,
particularly when it is selected as an alternative to litigation or as part of the litigation
process.
41 See, e.g., Jennifer Gerarda Brown & Ian Ayres, Economic Rationales for Mediation,
80 VA. L. REv. 323, 393 (1994) (stating that "information is the raw material of the
mediator's craft"); Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO. L.J.
1789, 1806 (2000) (arguing that withholding information in a negotiation increases
transaction costs and raises the risk of impasse).
42 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 754, 793 (1984) (maintaining that without
information exchange negotiators will fail to discover the full range of issues and the
value each party assigns to those issues, which will restrict the range of solutions and
leave needs unmet); Dean G. Pruitt, Achieving Integrative Agreements, in NEGOTIATING
IN ORGANIZATIONS 35, 36-41 (Max H. Bazerman & RoyJ. Lewicki eds., 1983) (discuss-
ing five methods for refocusing a dispute in order to achieve integrative agreements
that reconcile, as opposed to compromising, the parties' separate interests).
43 See Ellen E. Deason, Predictable Mediation Confidentiality in the U.S. Federal System,
17 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 239, 245-46 (2002).
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however, have this control outside the mediation process, particularly
in follow-up or unrelated litigation. Absent adequate legal protection,
the opposing party may reveal, or the mediator may be compelled to
reveal, mediation communications. 44 There is thus a real risk that in-
formation shared in mediation could come back to haunt or hurt the
person who disclosed it. As a result, if parties are to participate in
mediation wholeheartedly, they need to have confidence that they can
predict the extent to which their statements will be protected from
disclosure. 45
Preventing disclosures is also crucial to another important aspect
of mediation. Mediator neutrality, "a primary value of mediation,"46
depends on the mediator's ability to avoid taking sides. Neutrality is
impossible, however, if a mediator is called to testify about events in a
mediation; in the win-lose posture of litigation, such testimony will
always favor one party over the other.47 Such lapses in neutrality dam-
age the mediation process itself,48 for its integrity depends on the in-
stitutional trustworthiness of mediators.
Procedural prohibitions on disclosures of mediation communica-
tions also safeguard the integrity of courts in a world of intertwined
44 See, e.g., FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 737 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (hearing
testimony about a mediation in the absence of a mediation privilege); In re Marriage
of Bidwell, 21 P.3d 161, 163 (Or. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that Oregon Evidence Code
section 408 does not bar admission of mediation communications offered in support
of a request for attorney's fees).
45 See Ellen E. Deason, The Quest for Uniformity in Mediation Confidentiality: Foolish
Consistency or Crucial Predictability?, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 79, 79 (2001) (discussing the
need for participant knowledge and confidence in relevant confidentiality rules in
mediation); Lawrence R. Freedman & Michael L. Prigoff, Confidentiality in Mediation:
The Need for Protection, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 37, 37-38 (1986) (same); Alan
Kirtley, The Mediation Privilege's Transformation from Theory to Implementation: Designing a
Mediation Privilege Standard to Protect Mediation Participants, the Process and the Public In-
terest, 1995 J. Disp. RESOL. 1, 15-19 (same).
46 Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for
Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 837 (1999). But see James
R. Coben, Gollum, Meet Smagol: A Schizophrenic Rumination on Mediator Values Beyond
Self-Determination and Neutrality, 5 CARnozo J. CONFLICT RESOL. 65, 73-74 (2004)
(describing neutrality as "ill-defined" with a "non-interventionist fiction [that] ob-
scures a favoring of the dominant community and dominant values") (footnote
omitted).
47 See NLRB v. Joseph Macaluso, Inc., 618 F.2d 51, 55-56 (9th Cir. 1980).
48 See Marchal v. Craig, 681 N.E.2d 1160, 1163 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (observing
that a neutral mediator is imperative for the mediation process); see also In re Anony-
mous, 283 F.3d 627, 640 (4th Cir. 2002) (establishing the standard that a circuit medi-
ator will be permitted to disclose mediation communications only when "disclosure is
mandated [to prevent] manifest injustice, is indispensable to resolution of an impor-
tant subsequent dispute, and is not going to damage our mediation program").
[VOL. 80:2
2005] PROCEDURAL RULES FOR COMPLEMENTARY SYSTEMS 5b5
mediation and litigation. Judges need to stay separated from the con-
tent of mediations because they might adjudicate the underlying dis-
pute or a dispute that arises out of a mediation. Procedures to limit
disclosures protect judges from the perception of bias and impropri-
ety that would be raised by the possibility of ex parte communications
about a mediation. This is especially true when the court sponsors a
mediation program and is thus linked institutionally to the media-
tion.49 Absent adherence to such rules, a suggestion that mediation
communications served as unauthorized evidence in a case could un-
dermine the promise of confidentiality made in court mediation pro-
grams and reduce public confidence in the courts that sponsor these
programs. Because of courts' active role in sponsoring and recom-
mending mediation, confidentiality provisions are necessary, not only
to encourage mediation, but also to protect the stature of the adjudi-
cation system.
B. The Inadequacy of Existing Protections
The shortcomings of other legal protections for confidentiality
and the vast variations in these provisions put the achievement of
the UMA in context. In the federal system, Rule 408 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence offers only limited protection for selected as-
pects of settlement negotiations,50 and federal legislation governs
confidentiality in only a fraction of mediations.5 1 The Alternative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (ADR Act), which mandates ADR
programs in federal district courts, does not itself establish any
procedural protections for confidentiality. Instead, the ADR Act
requires each district court to protect confidentiality in its program by
49 See ROBERTJ. NIEMIC ET AL., GUIDE TO JUDICIAL MANAGEMENT OF CASES IN ADR
112-13 (2001).
50 Criticism of Rule 408 abounds. See, e.g., COLE ET AL., supra note 4, §§ 9:5-7;
Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J.
955, 957-82 (1988); Deason, supra note 43, at 272-74; Kenneth R. Fineberg, Media-
tion-A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REv. S5, S33-35 (1989); Freed-
man & Prigoff, supra note 45, at 40-41; Philip J. Harter, Neither Cop Nor Collection
Agent: Encouraging Administrative Settlements by Ensuring Mediator Confidentiality, 41 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 315, 348-56 (1989); Kirtley, supra note 45, at 12-14. But see Charles W.
Ehrhardt, Confidentiality, Privilege and Rule 408: The Protection of Mediation Proceedings in
Federal Court, 60 LA. L. Rv. 91, 102-10, 119-26 (1999) (defending Rule 408 as
"promot[ing] many of the interests that would be served by a mediation privilege").
51 The federal Administrative Dispute Resolution Act includes a limited confiden-
tiality provision that functions like a privilege, but that Act covers only federal agency
mediation programs. 5 U.S.C. § 574(a), (b) (2000). The protection covers communi-
cations made in a caucus with an ADR neutral, but not in joint sessions with other
parties. Id. § 574(b) (7).
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local rules.5 2 These rules vary widely in their scope, terms, and effec-
tiveness,5 3 and some courts have found that local mediation confiden-
tiality rules are inadequate to prevent in-court disclosures about the
content of court-sponsored mediations.54 There has been limited
common law development of a mediation privilege in some of the fed-
eral courts,5 5 while others have declined to recognize this privilege in
the absence of a clear mandate from Congress. 56
52 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (2000). Courts have held that the ADR Act's "general man-
date to establish the confidentiality of court-ordered mediation proceedings" does
not itself create a mediation privilege. Folb v. Motion Picture Indus. Pension &
Health Plans, 16 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1176 (C.D. Cal. 1998), affd mem., 216 F.3d 1082
(9th Cir. 2000); see also FDIC v. White, 76 F. Supp. 2d 736, 738 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(stating that neither the ADR Act nor its legislative history creates a privilege for par-
ties in mediation).
53 Many of the federal court rules fail to designate any legal mechanism to pro-
tect confidentiality. See Deason, supra note 43, at 311-12 (noting the ambiguity of the
term "confidentiality" and uncertainty in court rules regarding their application to
disclosures in future cases, other courts, and extra-judicial settings); see also Gregory
A. Litt, Note, No Confidence: The Problem of Confidentiality by Local Rule in the ADR Act of
1998, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1015, 1015, 1023-35 (2000) (arguing that leaving the develop-
ment of mechanisms for mediation confidentiality to local rules is unwvise, in part
because of the resultant disparity).
54 See, e.g., Datapoint Corp. v. Picturetel Corp., No. Civ. A. 3:93-CV-2381D, 1998
WL 25536, at *2--3 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 1998) (declining to recognize a privilege in
Southern District of Texas Rule 20(I) despite terms making mediations confidential
and protecting them from disclosure).
Moreover, ironically, local rules may not even be applicable at all in some litiga-
tion concerning communications made in federal court mediation programs. For
example, under Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, state law of privilege is
controlling when state law supplies the rule of decision. See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mort-
gage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1121-25 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (applying state law on confi-
dentiality rather than the federal court rule to a dispute over enforcement of an
agreement reached in mediation).
Furthermore, even when federal law governs, Rule 501 does not by its terms rec-
ognize federal court rules as an appropriate source of privilege. See Deason, supra
note 43, at 313 (noting that Rule 501 requires federal courts applying federal law to
use "the federal common law of privilege unless required otherwise by the U.S. Con-
stitution, an act of Congress or a Supreme Court rule"). But see In re Anonymous, 283
F.3d 627, 630 n.16 (4th Cir. 2002) (using an attorney disciplinary proceeding to apply
its confidentiality rule rather than recognizing a federal mediation privilege).
55 See Sheldone v. Pa. Turnpike Comm'n, 104 F. Supp. 2d 511, 517 (W.D. Pa.
2000); Folb, 16 F. Supp. 2d at 1180. The Sixth Circuit has taken a more comprehen-
sive approach to the problem of confidentiality by creating a privilege for communi-
cations in settlement discussions without a limitation to mediation. See Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980-81 (6th Cir. 2003).
56 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Dec. 17, 1996, 148 F.3d 487, 493 (5th Cir.
1998); White, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 738; In re March, 1994-Special Grand Jury, 897 F.
Supp. 1170, 1173 (S.D. Ind. 1995).
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The states have taken the lead in providing mediation parties pro-
cedural assurances that the confidentiality of the process will be
respected. Prior to the UMA, virtually all of them provided some form
of confidentiality for some mediation communications. About half
had enacted a generally applicable mediation confidentiality provi-
sion; other protections were specific to particular types of disputes or
dispute resolution programs. 5 7 This abundance indicates the impor-
tance of mediation confidentiality to the states. It nonetheless has se-
rious drawbacks because of the unworkable statutory variation in
scope, legal framework, and exceptions.58 The states have served use-
fully as the proverbial laboratory, but more uniformity is now neces-
sary if disputants are to select mediation with confidence that their
mediation communications will not be disclosed to their detriment.59
The UMA was prepared in response to this need with the hope that
widespread enactment will offer comprehensive confidentiality pro-
tection and reduce substantially the current choice-of-law uncertain-
ties in multi-state mediations. 60 In addition, when state law applies,
the Act can also bring some degree of uniformity to protection in fed-
eral courts. It might even serve as a template for developing a match-
ing federal privilege.
C. Fostering Improved Protection and Uniformity
The goal of the UMA is to improve protection, coverage, and pre-
dictability for confidentiality in mediation. NCCUSL and ABA com-
mittees worked together in an innovative joint drafting effort to create
an Act with widespread support. 61 As of this writing, it has already
been enacted in two states-Nebraska and Illinois.
62
57 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT. prefatory note § 4 (2003). More than 250 state statutes
provided a mediation privilege in some form. Id. prefatory note § 3.
58 See Deason, supra note 45, at 89-95, for a description of the discrepancies and
ambiguities in statutory protection. See also Scott H. Hughes, The Uniform Mediation
Act: To the Spoiled Go the Privileges, 85 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 18 (2001) (asserting that "many
mediation statutes . . . are poorly worded, unclear, incomplete or internally
inconsistent").
59 See Deason, supra note 45, at 84-104.
60 See, e.g., Getty, supra note 36, at 161.
61 UNIF. MEDIATION ACr prefatory note § 5; Getty, supra note 36, at 158-59.
62 See 710 ILL. COMP. STAT. 35/1-13 (2004); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2930 to -2942
(2003). The UMA has also been introduced during the 2003-2004 legislative sessions
in numerous states and the District of Columbia. See S. 325, 113th Gen. Assem., 2d
Sess. (Ind. 2004); S. 2235, 80th Gen. Assem. (Iowa 2004); Assem. 841, 211th Leg. (N.J.
2004); District of Columbia 15-289 (2003); H.D. 4489, 183d Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2003); S.
1340, 226th Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); H.R. 303, 125th Gen. Assem. (Ohio 2003); H.R.
227, 67th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 2003); S. 97, 67th Biennial Sess. (Vt. 2003).
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The centerpiece of the Act is a privilege that prevents disclosure
of mediation communications, broadly defined, in discovery processes
or as evidence in a proceeding. 63 Actually, the Act establishes multi-
ple privileges. A party to a mediation may refuse to disclose, and may
prevent another person from disclosing, mediation communica-
tions. 64 In addition, the mediator and other participants (such as ex-
perts) each hold their own privileges, limited to their own mediation
communications. 65 The Act leaves control in the hands of the parties
in that they may agree in advance to dispense with privilege for all or
part of their mediation. 66 Otherwise, the Act's privileges apply unless
the relevant holders have waived their privileges, the information is
otherwise subject to discovery or admissible, or the communication is
exempt. 67
Privileges have exemptions that embody a weighing of competing
values: they permit disclosures deemed necessary for goals that tran-
scend the justifications for keeping the protected communications
confidential. The majority of the UMA exceptions are formulated as
bright-line rules to take advantage of the predictability offered to par-
ties by a specific list of exemptions. The Act authorizes disclosures
for: a recorded agreement signed by all the parties; communications
in mediations open to the public or covered by open record or meet-
ing acts; threats of bodily injury or violence; certain communications
connected to criminal activity; information relevant to a claim of pro-
fessional misconduct or malpractice; and statements that would be in-
troduced in certain abuse, neglect or abandonment proceedings. 68
The formulation of the UMA exceptions is one of the drafting
compromises that centered on the appropriate relationship between
mediation and litigation. The drafting committees considered supple-
menting the bright line exceptions to the privilege with a more flexi-
ble exception that would rely on judicial balancing.69 It would have
63 UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 4.
64 Id. §4(b)(1).
65 Id. § 4(b)(2)-(3).
66 Id. § 3(c).
67 Id. §§ 4(a), 4(c), 5(a). In addition, persons are precluded from asserting a
privilege if they have prejudiced another person in the mediation by disclosing a me-
diation communication or if they have used a mediation to plan, attempt, or commit
a crime or conceal an ongoing crime. Id. § 5(b)-(c).
68 Id. § 6(a)(1)-(7).
69 Several statutes provide examples of a balancing approach to determine when
exceptions are appropriate. See, e.g., Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 574(a) (4) (A) (2000) (prohibiting disclosures unless a court determines disclosure
is necessary to prevent "manifest injustice"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4112(B)(1)(c)
(West Supp. 2000) (authorizing disclosures to interpret or enforce a mediated agree-
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directed judges to authorize disclosures "to prevent a manifest injus-
tice of such magnitude as to outweigh the importance of protecting
the confidentiality in mediation proceedings." 70 Although this provi-
sion would have covered unforeseen or exceptional circumstances
and guided judges in exercising their discretion, representatives of
the mediator community opposed it strongly on the ground that it
would stimulate litigation. 71 Their fierce objections seemed motivated
by an underlying distrust ofjudges' willingness to protect confidential-
ity adequately. 72 In the end, the general exception to prevent injus-
tice through the judicial process was not included in the Uniform Act.
Some case-by-case balancing to determine exceptions remains in
the Act, but it is confined to two instances where a bright-line rule is
unworkable: criminal proceedings and proceedings to enforce or void
an agreement reached in mediation. In these settings, mediation
communications may be disclosed if a judge determines that the need
for the evidence "substantially outweighs the interest in protecting
confidentiality. ' 73 The Act protects confidentiality during this deci-
sion process by mandating an in camera hearing, and it places the
burden of meeting the standard for disclosure on the proponent of
evidence to be introduced.7 4
Despite the uncertainty associated with a balancing approach, ju-
dicial input and case-by-case decisions are advisable in criminal cases
and contract proceedings on a mediated agreement. In criminal pro-
ceedings, the stakes associated with the availability of evidence are
ment if necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2317.023(C)(4) (West 2004) (permitting courts to expand the statutory list of ex-
ceptions when necessary to prevent "manifest injustice"); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 904.085(4) (e) (West 2000) (creating an exception to prevent manifest injustice only
in cases other than the mediated dispute). See Kirtley, supra note 45, for an analysis
of designing exceptions to a mediation privilege. Courts have also adopted balancing
approaches. See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 283 F.3d 627, 637 (4th Cir. 2002) (establish-
ing a "manifest injustice" standard); Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d
1110, 1131-32 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (balancing the importance of the interest in confi-
dentiality against the importance of the rights or interests that would be endangered
without disclosure).
70 This provision first appeared in the UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 2(c) (5) (April
1999 Draft), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulcframe.htm.
71 See Hughes, supra note 58, at 56 (describing the fear that a balancing test
"would open the floodgates of litigation as each opportunistic lawyer attempted to
take advantage of the provision to pierce the sanctity of the mediation process").
72 See id. at 63 (reporting that "the mediation community distrusted the court's
ability to fairly and consistently interpret . . . exceptions [for contractual
misconduct]").
73 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 6(b).
74 Id.
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high and, depending on the circumstances, excluding evidence may
implicate the defendant's constitutional rights. In proceedings to en-
force or void a mediated agreement, neither permitting disclosure
nor maintaining confidentiality is appropriate for every case. Without
an exception to the privilege, a party would be unable to present evi-
dence of duress or fraud that occurred during a mediation. Yet a
bright-line automatic exception that would allow disclosure of media-
tion communications to support any claimed contract defense could
be used too easily with unjustified allegations to undermine confiden-
tiality. Given the undesirable outcomes that can flow from either of
these blanket approaches to disclosure, a judicial determination for
individual cases is the best option to resolve the competing values at
stake.75 Statutes that instead speak in absolute terms invite judge-
made exceptions to prevent unjust enforcement of mediated
agreements. 76
Among the Act's most controversial provisions 77 is one that di-
rectly implicates conflicting values associated with adjudication and
mediation. In two instances, exceptions to the privilege that allow dis-
closures do not apply to mediators: the mediator may not be com-
pelled to provide evidence of a mediation communication (1) in
connection with a complaint of professional misconduct filed against
a party, party representative, or nonparty participant, or (2) in a pro-
ceeding to enforce or void a contract reached in mediation. 78 These
restrictions on otherwise recognized exceptions to the mediation priv-
ilege place a strong weight on the principle of mediator neutrality, as
mediators are exempted from providing information in situations
where it could favor one party over the other. 79 At the same time,
however, these restrictions could limit courts' abilities to exercise
their traditional equitable powers to void an unfair contract or to
sanction misconduct, relegating judicial decisionmaking to a less ef-
fective role in ensuring a fair agreement. In my view, this provision
goes too far in handicapping the role of the adjudication system.80
75 See Ellen E. Deason, Enforcing Mediated Settlement Agreements: Contract Law Col-
lides with Confidentiality, 35 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 33, 89 (2001).
76 See, e.g., Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1139 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (admitting a mediator's testimony on a claim of duress after an in camera
hearing).
77 See, e.g., Hughes, supra note 58, at 64-68.
78 UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 6(c). Note that the mediator can be compelled to tes-
tify if misconduct allegations are directed at his role in the mediation.
79 See supra text accompanying note 47.
80 See also Hughes, supra note 58, at 66 (criticizing restrictions on mediator testi-
mony as "protectionism on behalf of mediators").
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This special treatment for mediators also reveals conflicts among
mediation values. The Act's policy decision to prohibit mediator testi-
mony on contract defenses and misconduct allegations tends to ele-
vate mediator neutrality over the importance of the integrity of the
process and party self-determination. As the only neutral observer, a
mediator's testimony may be crucial to determining the strength of
claims about what occurred during a mediation.81 If excluding medi-
ator testimony means that a party who was tricked or forced into an
agreement cannot avoid enforcement, the outcome is not the product
of a truly consensual process.8 2 Conversely, mediation does not honor
its promise of self-determination if a party is unable to enforce a valid
mediated agreement. And, in the case of misconduct by participants,
the mediation process itself may be impaired if an aggrieved party
lacks recourse in the absence of mediator testimony.
Finally, there are happily some UMA provisions that rest on com-
plementary values rather than on a choice among competing values.
For example, the Act keeps judges and mediators institutionally sepa-
rate by prohibiting mediator reports. 83 Mediators may not communi-
cate with a court about a mediation except to convey limited
information on the status of the process or disclosures excepted from
the privilege, 84 and courts may not consider a communication made
in violation of the rule. 85 This provision furthers adjudication values,
party expectations of confidentiality and mediator neutrality.86
One may disagree with some of the drafters' choices, but they
have performed a difficult balancing act among competing goals. As
the above examples show, many aspects of the Act implicate values
central to mediation and adjudication. It will be important to track
the cumulative effect of these provisions on the practice of mediation
and litigation, and their consequences for the ongoing process of
integration.
81 See, e.g., Ramirez v. Decoster, 142 F. Supp. 2d 104, 113 (D. Me. 2001) (recog-
nizing the mediator as "the most neutral and dispassionate observer of what was said
and done"); Olam, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 1136-38 (discussing the importance of media-
tor's testimony to a claim of duress).
82 See, e.g., Nolan-Haley, supra note 46, at 806-09 (characterizing fraud and du-
ress litigation as a "thin but growing jurisprudence of 'mediation' informed
consent").
83 UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 7.
84 A mediator may disclose that a mediation was held, if it has terminated,
whether or not a settlement was reached, and attendance at the mediation. Id.
§ 7(b) (1). A mediator may also report abuse or neglect to the appropriate agency.
Id. § 7(b)(3).
85 Id. § 7(c).
86 See supra text accompanying note 49.
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III. EXPANSION TO INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL MEDIATION
As the UMA emerged in the United States, a parallel model law
drafting project was conducted simultaneously under the auspices of
UNCITRAL. 87 This international project reflected increasing interest
in using mediation for transnational private disputes,88 an interest
that has grown along with the perception that international arbitra-
tion has taken on some of the procedural characteristics of litigation,
particularly U.S. litigation.89 Thus the impetus for the drafting pro-
cess was, at least in part, changes that are taking place at another in-
terface between adjudication and ADR. The Model Law was
influenced by the UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules, 90 with additional
"inspiration" from the UMA. 91 It is a legislative text designed to be
87 UNCITRAL was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 1966,
with a mandate to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of
international trade. G.A. Res. 2205, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., 1497th plen. mtg. at 99,
U.N. Doc. A/2205 (1966). It is concerned, among other things, with the resolution of
international disputes between private parties. The preparation of the Model Law
involved ninety states, twelve intergovernmental organizations, and twenty-two non-
governmental organizations. Jernej Sekolec & Michael B. Getty, The UMA and the
UNCITRAL Model Rule: An Emerging Consensus on Mediation and Conciliation, 2003 J.
Disp. RESOL. 175, 183.
88 Sekolec & Getty, supra note 87, at 175; Eric van Ginkel, The UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Conciliation: A Critical Appraisal, 21 J. INT'L ARB. 1, 2
(2004).
89 See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL OR-
DER 51-57 (1996); ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRA-
TION 340 (2d ed. 2002). The discovery process of document production, oral cross-
examination of witnesses, and testimony by party-affiliated witnesses are no longer
unusual in international arbitrations. See, e.g., Susan L. Karamanian, Overstating the
"Americanization" of International Arbitration: Lessons from ICSID, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON Dise.
RESOL. 5, 24-28 (2003); Lucy Reed &Jonathan Sutcliffe, The "Americanization" of Inter-
national Arbitration?, in MFAIEY's INT'L ARB. REPORT, Apr. 2001, at 11, 37. Some com-
mentators, however, see these developments as part of the harmonization of civil and
common law approaches rather than as Americanization. See, e.g., Elena V. Helmer,
International Commercial Arbitration: Americanized, "Civilized," or Harmonized?, 19 OHIO
ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 35, 37 (2003); Reed & Sutcliffe, supra.
90 The UNCITRAL Conciliation Rules were adopted in 1980; they are designed to
provide rules that an organization can use in administering mediations or that parties
can adopt by agreement for their mediation. CONCILIATION RULES OF THE UNITED
NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, U.N. GAOR, 35th Sess., 81st
plen. mtg. at 260, U.N. Doc. A/35/52 (1980), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
english/texts/arbitration/conc-rules.htm.
91 Sekolec & Getty, supra note 87, at 194. UNCITRAL's drafting process was in
touch with the development of the Uniform Mediation Act through the Chair of the
NCCUSL drafting committee, Michael B. Getty, who served as a U.S. advisor to the
UNCITRAL drafting committee under the auspices of the State Department. Id. at
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adopted by individual nations as part of their domestic law. This goal
was advanced in the United States in 2003, when the Model Law-
with a key addition-became an amendment to the UMA.9 2
The Model Law is more limited in scope than the UMA. While it
defines conciliation broadly,93 it explicitly covers only conciliations
that are international and commercial. 94 This limitation is consistent
with UNCITRAL's commercial mandate, and it also reflects a judg-
ment that a model law would be easier for many nations to enact if it
did not implicate their existing domestic conciliation legislation.95
This limitation -in scope reduced the need for difficult choices be-
tween competing values expressed in adjudication and conciliation
systems of different countries. The Model Law has the potential, how-
ever, to foster a more comprehensive harmonization of mediation law
than its stated coverage. The text is designed to provide a model that
could be extended to non-commercial international disputes or
adapted to govern domestic conciliations by states that do not yet have
such law.96
The Model Law contains constant affirmations of the autonomy
of the parties to a conciliation. They may opt in to its provisions by
agreeing that their dispute is international. 97 They may opt out of its
coverage by agreement.98 The parties may also vary the Model Law's
175; JAMS, Hon. Michael B. Getty (Ret.), at http://www.jamsadr.com/neutrals/Bio.asp?
NeutralID=1640 (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
92 UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 11 (2003).
93 The Model Law defines conciliation as a process
whereby parties request a third person or persons ("the conciliator") to assist
them in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute aris-
ing out of or relating to a contractual or other legal relationship. The con-
ciliator does not have the authority to impose upon the parties a solution to
the dispute.
MODEL LAw, supra note 12, art. 1(3). The Model Law is intended to apply to media-
tion and other dispute resolution processes that meet this description without regard
to their label. The definition expresses "a broad notion of a voluntary process con-
trolled by the parties and conducted with the assistance of a neutral third person or
persons." Model Law Draft Guide, supra note 12, at 9. It is meant to be inclusive of
procedural styles and variations in techniques. Id. For example, the Model Law is
meant to apply whether the neutral is facilitating dialogue or also making substantive
proposals for possible settlements. Id.; Sekolec & Getty, supra note 87, at 184-85.
94 MODEL LAW, supra note 12, art. 1 (1).
95 van Ginkel, supra note 88, at 12.
96 In Article 1, note 2, the Model Law offers guidance for states that wish to adopt
it to govern their domestic disputes. MODEL LAW, supra note 12, art. 1 n.2.
97 Id. art. 1(6).
98 Id. art. 1(7).
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individual provisions by agreement,9 9 with the exception of its princi-
ples for interpreting the law' 0 0 and its principle of fair treatment of
the parties.' 0 ' Individual articles reiterate this permission to deviate
from the law by agreement. I0 2
Compared to the UMA, the Model Law's emphasis on autonomy
makes it more entirely a default provision subject to change by the
parties. The UMA allows parties to agree in advance to dispense with
the privilege, and single parties may waive their privilege,10 3 but par-
ties cannot opt out of the entire Act or tinker with its specific provi-
sions. The Model Law's approach not only reflects UNCITRAL's
tradition of stressing party autonomy, but also softens the conse-
quences of the drafters' policy choices between competing values. It
has been criticized as a lost opportunity for greater harmonization
that would have been possible with a binding law regulating the rela-
tionship between conciliation and adjudication.10 4 As a compromise
to encourage widespread enactment, however, and with a flexible pro-
cess such as conciliation that relies on party self-determination, it does
not seem inappropriate to have limited the Model Law's attempts to
harmonize widely-varying international adjudication systems to the
framework within which the parties may exercise their discretion.
The Model Law's treatment of confidentiality has the same thrust
as that of the UMA, but differs in its emphasis and details. Most signif-
icantly, the Model Law uses an evidentiary exclusion as a legal mecha-
nism to limit disclosures in court proceedings rather than a
privilege. 0 5 (Privileges are not familiar in most other legal sys-
tems.)1 06 Instead of the UMA's broad protection for "mediation com-
munications," the Model Law protects only a specific list of
communications, such as statements by the parties and proposals by
the conciliator. 10 7 The parties can, in effect, agree to waive these evi-
99 Id. art. 3.
100 Id. art. 2.
101 Id. art. 6(3).
102 For example, the Model Law provides a framework of procedures for concilia-
tions and choosing conciliators, but these are clearly presented as default provisions
for parties who have not selected their own approach. Id. arts. 5-6; Sekolec & Getty,
supra note 87, at 187-88.
103 UNIF. MEDIATION AcT §§ 3(c), 4(a) (2003).
104 See van Ginkel, supra note 88, at 7, 19.
105 MODEL LAW, supra note 12, art. 10.
106 For example, the interests protected by the attorney-client privilege are instead
furthered in civil law countries by subjecting attorneys to a legal duty of secrecy. EDNA
SELAN EPSTEIN, THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODuCT DOCTRINE
470 (4th ed. 2001).
107 MODEL LAw, supra note 12, art. 10(1).
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dentiary exclusions, 0 8 but there is no provision for the conciliator or
other participants to object to a disclosure if the exclusion is waived by
the parties. Another distinction is that there are few exceptions to the
Model Law evidentiary exclusions. The listed communications may be
disclosed only when required by law or "for the purposes of imple-
mentation or enforcement of a settlement agreement."' 09 With the
possibility of waiver and these exceptions, the Model Law exclusion
could be treated functionally as a privilege, but the holders, scope and
exceptions would be inconsistent with those of the UMA. Thus, to
avoid conflicts of law, the Model Law needed to be coordinated with
the UMA.
The drafters who adapted the Model Law for adoption by the
states hoped to develop a text that would be compatible with the
UMA, but would also maintain as much as possible the identity of the
Model Law in order to promote international harmonization and help
foreign parties feel comfortable mediating in the United States. After
an attempt at modifying the Model Law to fit within the style of the
UMA, the drafters wisely abandoned this effort and decided to retain
the Model Law's exact form and language. The UMA incorporates
the Model Law-intact-as an amendment to govern international
commercial mediations.1 1 0 It then superimposes the UMA's privilege,
waiver, and exception provisions onto the Model Law,"' creating a
structure that extends the values recognized in those provisions into
the international context unless the parties decide otherwise. As with
the limited scope of the Model Law and its emphasis on autonomy,
this "double-grafting" approach helps minimize the need to choose
among competing values. Adding the Model Law without alteration
tolerates many differences between the texts that do not pose real
conflicts, while further adding the UMA's privilege avoids what would
otherwise be significant inconsistencies in the protections against
disclosure.
Because both the UMA and the Model Law offer opportunities
for parties to alter their terms by agreement, parties can select the
combination of provisions best suited for their circumstances. The
UMA amendment offers a "roadmap" for parties that coordinates the
opt-ins and opt-outs in both texts. As with any mediation under the
UMA, the parties may agree that all or part of an international com-
108 The permission granted by article 3 for the parties to alter provisions of the
Model Law by agreement provides a mechanism for a waiver of the law's evidentiary
exclusion.
109 MODEL LAW, supra note 12, art. 10(3).
110 UNIF. MEDIATION Acr § 11 (2003).
111 Id. § l1(c).
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mercial mediation is not privileged, 11 2 and in this way select the
Model Law without the UMA privilege provisions.' 13 Alternatively,
under the provisions of the Model Law, parties to an international
commercial mediation may agree that the Model Law does not ap-
ply. 114 This allows them to select only the UMA provisions for their
mediation." 5 Absent any agreement, the hybrid UMA-Model Law
governs when a mediation is both international and commercial.
By making international conciliation under the UNCITRAL
Model Law compatible with U.S. legal procedures, the UMA provides
a vehicle for resolving international disputes that foreign parties seek
to avoid litigating in U.S. courts. In addition to its role in defining the
interface between mediation and adjudication in the United States,
the UMA now creates a new relationship between U.S. and interna-
tional dispute resolution systems more generally. It will allow media-
tion to join arbitration as an option for resolving commercial disputes
when the distinctive characteristics of U.S. litigation are unattractive
to foreign partners.
IV. ENFORCING MEDIATED AGREEMENTS
With legal structures developed to support the use of mediation
by protecting the confidentiality of mediation communications, the
question becomes whether additional procedural measures are
needed. An issue that has already been raised and will likely receive
continuing attention is the desirability of a mechanism for enforcing
agreements reached in mediation. 1' 6 Legal development in this area
would again have consequences not only for mediation, but also for its
relationships with adjudication and arbitration.
112 Id. § 3(c).
113 See id. § 11(c).
114 MODEL LAW, supra note 12, art. 1(7).
115 UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 11 (d).
116 These comments focus on the process of enforcing agreements that result
from the mediation process and do not consider enforcement of agreements to medi-
ate. There are few reported cases that suggest difficulties with pre-dispute mediation
agreements, although perhaps problems will grow with increased use. See, e.g., M.L.B.
Kaye Int'l Realty, Inc. v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 3249(DC),
2004 WL 385034, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004) (enforcing an agreement to mediate
as the first step of the parties' disputing process); Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo, 295 F.
Supp. 2d 774, 781-84 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (holding unconscionable a mediation agree-
ment that, among other terms, required an employee to file a claim within ten days,
mediate without representation, and choose a mediator from a list compiled by the
employer).
[VOL. 8o:2
2005] PROCEDURAL RULES FOR COMPLEMENTARY SYSTEMS 577
A. The Enforcement Setting-Adjudication and Arbitration
Within the United States, state courts routinely enforce judg-
ments rendered by a court of another state under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution.1 17 In contrast, enforcement
poses formidable challenges in international litigation. The United
States is not a party to any treaties on recognizing foreign judgments,
either bilateral or regional.1 8 It is liberal in recognizing judgments of
courts in other countries, but foreign courts often refuse to do the
same for U.S. judgments. 1 9 They balk at enforcing a decision made
by a court that has exercised jurisdictional powers unrecognized by
the enforcing court and applied laws alien to the legal system of the
enforcing sovereign. 
120
The primary international forum for attempts to resolve recogni-
tion and enforcement problems has been the Hague Conference on
Private International Law, which sponsored negotiations of a conven-
tion on international jurisdiction and recognition of judgments.
Those negotiations produced a draft in 2001,121 but at that point the
parties reached a stalemate on multiple issues. 1 22 The project has now
117 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
118 See generally WILLIAM W. PARK, INTERNATIONAL FORUM SELECTION 46-49 (1995)
(discussing the lack of judgment treaties to limit international forum shopping).
119 See Linda Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the
Proposed HagueJudgments Convention be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 319, 321-22 (2002).
But see Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 EMORY L.J. 171 (2004) (analyzing
the refusal of U.S. courts to enforce foreign judgments based on foreign laws that
would be unconstitutional).
120 Silberman, supra note 119, at 319-20 (explaining that the reach of U.S. courts'
jurisdiction is controversial internationally because U.S. courts impose disfavored pro-
cedures such as juries, discovery, class actions, and contingent fees, and apply substan-
tive U.S. law considered pro-plaintiff by other nations).
121 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAw, SUMMARY OF THE OUTCOME OF
THE DISCUSSION IN COMMISSION II OF THE FIRST PART OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
6-20 (2001), available at http://www.hcch.net/doc/jdgm2001drafte.doc.
122 See HAGUE CONFERENCE ON PRIVATE INT'L LAW, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PRE-
SENT STATE OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE JUDGMENTS PROJECT IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
FUTURE WORK PROGRAMME OF THE CONFERENCE (2002), available at http://www.hcch.
net/doc/genpdl6e.doc. Among the topics identified as areas in which "a lack of
consensus creates obstacles to progress" were the Internet and e-commerce, activity-
based jurisdiction, consumer and employment contracts, and intellectual property
rights. Id. at 5. For a summary of the position of the U.S. government, see Negotia-
tions at the Hague Conference for a Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Civil Judgments, Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property
of the Comm. on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (2000) (state-
ment of Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Advisor for Private Int'l Law, U.S. Dep't of
State), available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/kova0629.htm.
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been reduced in scale with a new, more limited goal of drafting a less
ambitious international convention that would make choice-of-court
agreements effective in the international business context. 123 There is
currently little hope for a comprehensive treaty,124 and the lack of
adequate enforcement mechanisms remains a major problem in inter-
national adjudication.
Arbitration also offers a straightforward mechanism for enforce-
ment of U.S. domestic awards by using the adjudication system.
Under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),125 a party may seek an or-
der confirming an arbitral award in federal court. 126 Unless the court
vacates, modifies or corrects the award on narrow statutory grounds or
judicially crafted standards, it must confirm it, which in effect makes
the award a judgment of the court and enforceable as such. 127
123 DRAFT ON EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS (Hague Conference on
Private Int'l Law, Working Doc. No. 110 E, 2004), available at http://www.hcch.net/
doc/jdgmwdll0_e.pdf. In its current draft version, the convention would impose
three obligations on courts of Member States for international business-to-business
cases with exclusive choice of court agreements: the chosen court would be obliged to
hear the dispute rather than dismissing it on grounds of forum non conveniens, other
courts would be obliged to decline jurisdiction, and enforcing courts would be
obliged to recognize the judgment of the chosen court. Id. arts. 5, 7, 9; MASATO
DOGAUCHI & TREVOR C. HARTLEY, DRAFT REPORT, PRELIMINARY DRAFT CONVENTION ON
EXCLUSIVE CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 6 (Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law,
Preliminary Document No. 26, 2004), available at http://hcch.e-vision.nl/upload/
wop/jdgm-pd26e.pdf.
124 See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren, Theory and Practice of Adjudicatory Authority in
Private International Law: A Comparative Study of the Doctrine, Policies and Practices of Com-
mon-and Civil Law Systems, 295 RECUEIL DES CouRs 9, 424 (2002) ("Universal instru-
ments harmonizing broad areas of the law of jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments do not have a bright future.").
125 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000).
126 Id. § 9. A party has one year from the date the award is rendered to initiate the
confirmation process. Id.
127 Under the FAA, a court may vacate an award obtained by corruption or fraud,
or when the arbitrators exhibited partiality or corruption, were guilty of misconduct
during the hearing, or exceeded their powers. Id. § 10. In addition, "manifest disre-
gard of the law" is a judicially-created ground that courts describe inconsistently but
uniformly apply stringently. See, e.g., Brabham v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 376 F.3d
377, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2004); Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64-66 (2d Cir.
2003); George Watts & Son, Inc. v. Tiffany & Co., 248 F.3d 577, 581 (7th Cir. 2001);
LaPrade v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 246 F.3d 702, 706 (D.C. Cir. 2001); Montes v.
Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d 1456, 1460-61 (lth Cir. 1997); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995); Advest,
Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-9 (1st Cir. 1990); see also Stephen L. Hayford, Law in
Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA. L. REv.
731, 764 (1996) (discussing other nonstatutory grounds for vacatur of arbitration
awards adopted by federal circuits).
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Unlike adjudication, arbitration also offers an enforcement
mechanism in international disputes. Because it is a private process, it
sidesteps sensitive issues of sovereignty that can be problematic with
adjudication. If a party seeks to enforce an award, a court need not
endorse a decision rendered by a foreign sovereign's legal system, but
merely recognize the validity of a privately-agreed process. Over 130
countries, including the United States, have agreed to procedures for
recognition in the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, more commonly known as the New York
Convention. 12 8
Under the Convention, domestic courts are to recognize foreign
arbitral awards as binding and "enforce them in accordance with the
rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon. ' 129
The Convention provides limits on this enforcement obligation by
permitting courts to refuse to enforce awards (1) if they fall within a
list of limited defenses based on procedural infirmities, or (2) if en-
forcement would be contrary to the public policy of the enforcing
country.130  There are some enforcement uncertainties created
through the reference to domestic law in the enforcement obliga-
tion, 1 31 the resort to domestic law necessitated by the lack of defini-
tion in some of the procedural defenses,1 32 and flexible definitions of
128 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].
In the United States, the Convention is codified as Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, which governs international commercial arbitration.
Id. § 202.
129 New York Convention, supra note 128, art. III, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S.
at 39.
130 The procedural defenses include an invalid agreement to arbitrate, lack of no-
tice or an opportunity to present one's case, an award that exceeds the scope of power
delegated to the arbitrators, an irregularly constituted panel or procedure, or an
award vacated in the country that was the situs of the arbitration. Id. art. V(1) (a)-(e)
Ill, 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 39. A court may also refuse to enforce an award
by reason of the law of the enforcing country if the dispute is not arbitrable or en-
forcement would be contrary to public policy. Id. art. V(2), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330
U.N.T.S. at 39.
131 See supra text accompanying note 129. The uncertainty created by this refer-
ence to domestic procedural law is illustrated by recent U.S. decisions refusing to
confirm foreign awards on grounds of forum non conveniens, Monegasque de Reas-
surances v. Nak Naftogaz, 158 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), affd, 311 F.3d 488 (2d
Cir. 2002), and lack of minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction, Glencore Grain v.
Shivnath Rai Harnarain, 284 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2002). See Pelagia Ivanova, Forum
non Conveniens and Personal Jurisdiction: Procedural Limitations on the Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention, 83 B.U. L. REv. 899 (2003).
132 One prominent example of the uncertainty created by unspecified standards is
the provision permitting courts to refuse to enforce an award that has been vacated in
2005]
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public policy under domestic law. 13 3 The potential for procedural
problems has, however, been reduced by wide-spread harmonization
of arbitration standards through enactment of the UNCITRAL Model
Law on International Commercial Arbitration around the globe. 3 4
The Convention generally functions to minimize variation in enforce-
ment of arbitral awards, which is a major reason why arbitration is
attractive for international commercial disputes. This degree of pre-
dictability is particularly important for citizens of countries, like the
United States, that lack treaties establishing reliable mechanisms for
enforcing court judgments.
B. Mediated Agreements
There are no comparable special enforcement mechanisms for
agreements parties reach in mediation. Evidence suggests that media-
tion results in a high rate of compliance because parties are more
accepting of a consensual solution than an imposed decision. 135
Nonetheless, the amount of litigation over enforcement of mediated
agreements indicates that some compliance problems do exist.136 Be-
cause enforcement often takes the form of separate time-consuming
the country where it was rendered. New York Convention, supra note 128, art. V
(1)(e), 21 U.S.T. at 2520, 330 U.N.T.S. at 39. The absence of detail in the Conven-
tion has generated multiple interpretations that make enforceability of a vacated
award vary depending on the forum where enforcement is sought. See, for example,
Christopher R. Drahozal, Enforcing Vacated International Arbitration Awards: An Economic
Approach, 11 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 451 (2000) (presenting an economic analysis of
when a court should enforce a vacated award), and sources cited therein.
133 The India Supreme Court recently set aside an arbitral award for legal error,
which it defined as a matter of public policy. Oil & Natural Gas Corp. v. SAW Pipes
Ltd., (2003) 5 S.C.C. 705, 737-38 (India); see Nadia Darwazeh & Rita F. Linnane, Set-
Aside and Enforcement Proceedings: The 1996 Indian Arbitration Act Under Threat?, 7 INT'L
ARB. L. REV. 81, 81 (2004) (arguing that the court conducted a review of the merits of
the case by making error of law a new ground to set aside an award).
134 UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 19th
Sess., Supp. No. 7, Annex 1, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/40/17 (1985), available at http://www.
uncitral.org/english/texts/arbitration/ml-arb.htm. The 1985 Model Law has been
enacted into law, or served as the basis for domestic law, in forty-eight countries and
five U.S. states. See U.N. Comm 'n on Int 'l Trade Law, Status of Conventions and Enactments
of UNCITRAL Model Laws, at http://www.uncitral.org/english/status/index.htm (last
modified Apr. 16, 2004).
135 See, e.g., Craig A. McEwen & Richard J. Maiman, Small Claims Mediation in
Maine: An Empirical Assessment, 33 ME. L. REV. 237, 241 (1981) (reporting that compli-
ance with mediated agreements was higher than with adjudicated decisions).
136 See Coben, supra note 46, at 65 n.1 (stating that litigation over mediation is
increasing and most often involves disputes about enforcement of mediated
settlements).
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contract litigation, an expedited method could contribute to media-
tion's attractiveness as a reliable, speedy, and relatively low-cost
process.
When a federal court suit is settled, enforcement of the agree-
ment "requires its own basis for jurisdiction,"'137 or else the parties can
end up in a separate state court suit. This can be avoided if there is an
independent federal ground of jurisdiction 38 or, alternatively, ancil-
laryjurisdiction.13 9 Since contract enforcement is typically a matter of
state law, 140 if the parties are not diverse they usually must rely on
ancillary jurisdiction. To do so, they should have their agreement ap-
proved and entered as a consent decree, have it incorporated into the
dismissal order, or have the court retain jurisdiction in the dismissal
order. 1
4 1
When a mediated case was originally filed in state court, settle-
ment enforcement can take a number of paths. For example, in Loui-
siana, a party may file a motion to enforce a settlement rather than a
new suit. 142 In contrast, Texas requires a separate suit to enforce me-
diated agreements, a practice that has been criticized as detracting
from the goal of efficient settlement.' 43 In some states, settlement en-
137 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994).
138 Bd. of Trs. of Hotel and Rest. Employees Local 25 v. Madison Hotel, Inc., 97
F.3d 1479, 1490 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (ruling that federal courts have jurisdiction to en-
force settlement agreements when enforcement raises issues of federal law).
139 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381-82; seeJeffrey A. Parness & Matthew R. Walker, En-
forcing Settlements in Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REv. 33, 37-38 (2003).
140 Federal courts tend to apply state contract law to enforcement issues, but
sometimes they emphasize the settlement of a federal right and use federal common
law. Discrepancies in the cases make predicting the applicable law for settlement
enforcement in federal court difficult. See Deason, supra note 43, at 298-301; Parness
& Walker, supra note 139, at 47-49.
141 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 381-82. Unfortunately, the Kokkonen opinion created
confusion among lower courts over what steps are necessary to incorporate a settle-
ment or retain enforcement jurisdiction. See Parness & Walker, supra note 139, at
38-43. Also, parties may hesitate to enter a consent decree because it will be on the
public record unless secrecy is necessary to protect trade secrets or for another com-
pelling reason. See, e.g.,Jessup v. Luther, 277 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir. 2002). Alterna-
tively, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) (6) may permit federal district courts to
reopen dismissed suits for breach of a settlement agreement, but cases on this issue
are split. See Parness & Walker, supra note 139, at 45-47.
142 Banque de Depots v. Bozel Mineracao E Ferroligas, 98-0742, p. 10 (La. App. 4
Cir. 1/27/99), 728 So. 2d 533, 538.
143 See, e.g., Davis v. Wickham, 917 S.W.2d 414, 416 (Tex. App. 1996); George B.
Murr, In the Matter of Marriage of Ames and the Enforceability of Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Agreements: A Case for Reform, 28 TEx. TECH L. REv. 31 (1997).
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forcement is eased if the agreement is approved by the court, 14 while
in others approval is necessary to enforce certain agreements. 45
Standards for enforcement also vary widely. Many state courts ap-
ply general principles of contract law to enforce mediated settlement
agreements. 146 Some states expedite enforcement by treating certain
mediated settlements-typically those of international commercial
disputes-as arbitral awards enforceable in summary proceedings. 147
In contrast, other states make it more difficult to prevail in an enforce-
ment proceeding when the contract is a mediated agreement. They
144 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-514 (2001) (providing that a mediated settlement
agreement can become an order of the court if the parties present it as a stipulation
and the court approves it).
145 See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09.1-07 (2004) (pertaining to mediated agree-
ments in contested child proceedings). In some states, court approval of agreements
reached in court-annexed mediation programs is a prerequisite to enforcement. See,
e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-22-308 (West 1997) ("[T]he agreement . . . if ap-
proved by the court, shall be enforceable as an order of the court."); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 23-603(c) (1995) ("Any understanding reached by the parties as a result of media-
tion shall not be binding upon the parties nor admissible in court until it is reduced
to writing ... and approved by the court.").
146 See, e.g., Sheng v. Starkey Labs., Inc., 117 F.3d 1081, 1083-84 (8th Cir. 1997);
Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001); Kaiser Found. Health Plan v. Doe,
903 P.2d 375, 378 (Or. Ct. App. 1995), modifed, 908 P.2d 850 (Or. Ct. App. 1996);
Martin v. Black, 909 S.W.2d 192, 195 (Tex. App. 1995); Snyder-Falkinham v. Stock-
burger, 457 S.E.2d 36, 40-41 (Va. 1995).
147 See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1297.401 (West Supp. 2004) (treating concili-
ated settlement of an international commercial dispute as a final arbitral award when
the agreement is written and signed by the conciliator and the parties or their repre-
sentatives); TEX. Crv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 172.211 (Vernon Supp. 2004)
(same).
Enforcement is expedited in other contexts by treating violations of a conciliated
agreement as a violation of the underlying statute. See, e.g., HAw. REv. STAT. § 515-18
(2000) (treating violators of civil rights agreements as having engaged in a discrimina-
tory practice); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-6(p) (West Supp. 2004) (treating violators as
subject to a cease and desist order issued by the Civil Rights Commission); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 299.6 (West Supp. 2004), amended by Act of Apr. 7, 2004, H.F. 2350, 2004 Iowa
Legis. Serv. 42 (West) (making a person who violates a school truancy mediation
agreement guilty of a misdemeanor).
Other states have strengthened the enforceability of certain mediated settle-
ments less directly by awarding attorney's fees to the enforcing party, GA. CODE ANN.
§ 45-19-39(c) (2002) (covering collective bargaining mediations); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 344.665 (Banks-Baldwin 1994) (governing Civil Rights Commission mediations of
housing discrimination), by setting more stringent standards to set aside a mediated
settlement, Tilden Groves Holding Corp. v. Orlando/Orange County Expressway, 816
So. 2d 658, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002), or by disallowing traditional grounds for
challenging a mediated settlement, Crupi v. Crupi, 784 So. 2d 611, 612-13 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2001) (holding that a party cannot challenge a mediated post-nuptial agree-
ment on grounds of "unfairness," although that ground is usually available).
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require formalities, such as a writing, mediator or attorney signatures,
or a statement that the parties intend the settlement to be enforcea-
ble, which become enforcement hurdles. 148 Enforcement can also be
impeded in practical terms by measures designed to protect media-
tion confidentiality when they make crucial evidence inadmissible in a
contract action to enforce or void a settlement agreement.149
Scholarly commentators have raised worries that mediation val-
ues may suffer in court enforcement proceedings. Based on a review
of enforcement cases, James J. Alfini and Catherine G. McCabe noted
that courts were generally sensitive to mediation principles, but ex-
pressed concerns about the ability of the judicial process to discern
and correct "troubling issues relating to mediation's core values of
party self-determination, voluntariness, and mediator impartiality"
that are raised by allegations of settlement coercion.1 50 They saw the
adjudication policy favoring settlements as emphasizing judicial econ-
omy at the expense of mediation principles and urged that courts en-
force mediated settlements within "a framework that recognizes
mediation's unique character and attributes." 151
Few scholars have explicitly analyzed using alternatives to con-
tract principles for the enforcement of mediated agreements. Early
on, Robert P. Burns urged the use of contract law to enforce settle-
148 See Deason, supra note 75, at 52-55. In addition, some states have a rescission
period that permits a party to avoid enforcement altogether. See Thompson, supra
note 19, at 539 n.170. Enforcement may also be subject to special defenses applicable
only to mediated agreements. See, e.g., MINN STAT. ANN. §§ 572.35, .36 (West 2000)
(making mediator's malfeasance a defense to an enforcement action); Vitakis-
Valchine v. Valchine, 793 So. 2d 1094, 1098, 1099 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (permit-
ting an attack on a mediated settlement on the ground of mediator misconduct in a
court-sponsored program).
149 See, e.g., Eisendrath v. Superior Ct., 134 Cal. Rptr. 2d 716, 720 (Ct. App. 2003);
Ryan v. Garcia, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1006, 1011-12 (1994); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. v. Price,
78 P.3d 1138 (Colo. Ct. App. 2003); Wilmington Hospitality v. New Castle County, 788
A.2d 536 (Del. Ch. 2001); Hudson v. Hudson, 600 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992);
Vernon v. Acton, 732 N.E.2d 805, 806 (Ind. 2000); Vick v. Waits, No. 05-00-01122-CV,
2002 WL 1163842, at *3 (Tex. App. June 4, 2002); Rendon v. Avance, 67 S.W.3d 303
(Tex. App. 2001). But see Few v. Hammack Enters., Inc., 511 S.E.2d 665, 669-70 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1999) (reading confidentiality statutes narrowly and requiring a mediator to
testify about an alleged oral settlement); Riner v. Newbraugh, 563 S.E.2d 802, 808-09
(W. Va. 2002) (suggesting that a mediator could testify in an enforcement action
without disclosing confidential information); Metz v. Metz, 61 P.3d 383, 389 (Wyo.
2003) (reasoning that a decision to admit a mediator's testimony was not prejudicial
because the court and counsel were "sensitive" about not probing settlement
discussions).
150 James J. Alfini & Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A
Survey of the Emerging Case Law, 54 ARK. L. REv. 171, 205 (2001).
151 Id. at 206.
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ment agreements, citing its flexibility to protect mediation values.1 52
More recently, Peter N. Thompson followed suit, but with reserva-
tions. He added a caveat that courts should "temper" their focus on
settlement and finality and be "cautious" about reading ambiguous
language in mediated agreements to create legal rights.1 53
Others have proposed modifying contract law outright in order
to safeguard mediation's values in a litigation setting. Nancy A. Welsh
advocated several special rules for enforcing mediated agreements, in-
cluding an expanded coercion defense and a cooling-off period that
would allow rescission immediately following a mediation. 154 Profes-
sor Welsh argued that these modifications are necessary to protect
self-determination in mediation, which she distinguishes from the ob-
jective manifestations of assent that are the focus of contract
analysis.155
In addition, without considering the possibility of summary pro-
cedures, I have argued elsewhere for altering contract standards to
accommodate confidentiality values in the mediation process. Medi-
ated agreements should be subject to a statute of frauds in enforce-
ment proceedings and mediation communications should be
admitted as evidence of contract defenses only after a threshold re-
view establishes that disclosure is needed and justified in the particu-
lar case. 156 This approach, which is similar to that of the UMA,
represents a compromise between the values of efficiency in enforce-
ment and maintaining confidentiality in mediation.
If enacted, an enforcement mechanism for mediated agreements
would presumably provide an alternative to a full application of con-
tract principles and eliminate any need for a separate lawsuit. The
UMA Drafting Committees sought a way to extend enforcement be-
yond existing court procedures for retaining jurisdiction 57 to a mech-
152 Robert P. Bums, The Enforceability of Mediated Agreements: An Essay on Legitima-
tion and Process Integrity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 93, 115 (1986) ("No persuasive
general argument exists for giving the mediated nature of an agreement necessary
legal consequences. Contract law provides a flexible set of considerations relevant to
the issue of enforceability that more adequately structure deliberation about that is-
sue than could any single general rule.").
153 Thompson, supra note 19, at 562-63.
154 Welsh, supra note 8, at 82-92.
155 Id. at 80; see also Steven Weller, Court Enforcement of Mediated Agreements: Should
Contract Law Be Applied?, JUDGES' J., Winter 1992, at 13, 39 (suggesting that because a
mediator's power distinguishes mediation from arms-length settlement, judges should
rescind agreements if there is a disparity in expertise between the parties and the
weaker party misunderstood the agreement or its consequences).
156 See Deason, supra note 75, at 45-50.
157 See supra text accompanying note 137.
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anism that would apply to private mediations as well. Over the course
of several years, they discussed multiple approaches to expedited en-
forcement by the courts.158 In their final draft, enforcement took the
form of a registration provision that would allow the parties and their
lawyers to move jointly for a court to enter ajudgment in accordance
with the mediated agreement and thereby receive expedited enforce-
ment.159 The Committees recommended against adoption of this pro-
vision, however, concluding that by the time the enforcement
provision was "circumscribed sufficiently to protect rights, the section
would not add significantly to the law related to mediation. '1 60
NCCUSL followed the Committees' recommendation and the
UMA, as adopted, does not provide procedures for expedited enforce-
ment of mediated agreements. Enforcement was similarly considered
in the UNCITRAL drafting process, but in the end the Model Law
contains only a provision that permits an enacting state to insert its
own enforcement procedures. 1 61 No single approach could be agreed
upon because of the wide variety of approaches to enforcing concili-
ated agreements around the globe. 162
Views are deeply divided on the issue of summary or expedited
enforcement of mediated agreements. There are important values at
stake on each side, and any enforcement procedure, including the
status quo, compromises some of those values. On one hand, sum-
mary enforcement could support the growth of mediation. From the
point of view of many international transactional lawyers, finality is the
crux of the matter: "What's the point of mediation if one has to go
and litigate to get the agreement enforced?" For these and other law-
158 These approaches included treating a mediated agreement as an arbitral
award by incorporating mediation into the enforcement provision of the Revised Uni-
form Arbitration Act, see, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 5 (Apr. 1999 Draft), and several
versions of a stipulated judgment model, see, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 10 (Jan.
2000 Draft); UNIF. MEDIATION Act § 11 (June 5, 2001 Annual Meeting Draft). The
UMA drafts are available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#umediat.
159 UNIF. MEDIATION AcT § 11 reporter's notes (June 5, 2001 Annual Meeting
Draft), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#umediat. A summary
enforcement procedure was also proposed in Florida in 2002 as part of the Family
Court Reform Bill, S. 1226, 2002 Sess. § 14 (Fla.). The legislation was not enacted,
but would have requested the Florida Supreme Court to establish a procedure for
filing and approving settlement agreements. See Paul Dayton Johnson, Jr., Confidenti-
ality in Mediation: What Can Florida Glean from the Uniform Mediation Act?, 30 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 487, 497 (2003).
160 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 11 reporter's notes (June 5, 2001 Annual Meeting
Draft), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#umediat.
161 MODEL LAW, supra note 12, art. 14.
162 See Model Law Draft Guide, supra note 12, at 25-26; Sekolec & Getty, supra note
87, at 193.
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yers, standardizing and streamlining the enforcement process would
remove a practical barrier and encourage mediation. Summary en-
forcement could also make it easier to maintain the confidentiality of
mediation communications by reducing the need for evidence per-
taining to the validity of agreements in contract actions. Ironically,
while an enforcement mechanism involving courts would further inte-
grate mediation and adjudication, it would also disentangle mediated
agreements from contract litigation.
On the other hand, contract rules set standards we have come to
regard as indicia of fair agreements. 163 Many forms of summary en-
forcement would bypass any consideration of contract defenses and
thus eliminate the application of those standards in court. This could
enable sophisticated parties to take advantage of weak or uninformed
parties and in this way threaten mediation's core principle of party
self-determination. If this happens, summary enforcement proce-
dures applied in the adjudication system could produce results that
are antithetical to mediation values.
Concern about enforcing agreements that are inconsistent with
informed self-determination is complicated, however, by potential un-
fairness in the converse situation. When a party is avoiding compli-
ance with a fair agreement, summary enforcement would support, not
undermine, the self-determination of the parties who freely entered
the agreement. In this context, extensive proceedings that are protec-
tive of unsophisticated parties may have the unintended consequence
of impairing self-determination if they deter enforcement. Which
form of impairment is more important to avoid?164 Perhaps we
should be more concerned with enforcing an agreement that was not
a product of self-determination than with failing to enforce one that
does reflect self-determination. In the former situation, enforcement
means the aggrieved party would have no further avenue for recourse,
whereas in the latter, the aggrieved party would have the option of
litigating the dispute. Even if finality argues against summary enforce-
ment, however, any form of enforcement, summary or not, unfortu-
nately carries a risk of impairing self-determination in one of these
situations.
163 But see Thompson, supra note 19, at 527 (distinguishing contract disputes from
mediated settlements); Welsh, supra note 8, at 60-64 (distinguishing mediation's con-
cept of self-determination from the focus in contract law on objective manifestations
showing an agreement reached with free will).
164 In social science terms, the question is whether to design a test to best avoid
false positive or false negative results. A legal example of avoiding false positives is the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof for criminal convictions. We would
rather err on the side of freeing the guilty than convicting the innocent.
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Perhaps effective means for protecting weak parties can be found
that would eliminate this dilemma concerning self-determination.
Proposals have been made to require that the parties' agreement in-
clude a statement that they intend summary enforcement, 65 which
could heighten the parties' awareness of the significance of their ac-
tions. But probably the most effective safeguard would be to limit
summary enforcement to mediations in which both parties are repre-
sented by counsel.1 66 The presence of lawyers would provide a check
on unfairness and assist parties in understanding the consequences of
their agreement. 167 In addition, mediations that cause some of the
greatest concerns-those where a strong party is paired with an un-
represented weaker party-would be ineligible for summary
enforcement.
Another approach would be to abandon any attempt at "one-size-
fits-all" enforcement and create a mechanism limited to a class of me-
diations that are least prone to abuse. For example, a U.S. enforce-
ment provision for mediated agreements could be limited to the
international commercial setting. This is a context where fairness is
less of a problem because parties are likely to be relatively sophisti-
cated and represented by counsel. Because of the shortcomings of
international enforcement ofjudicial decisions, it is also where parties
most need mediation enforcement mechanisms. A compromise on
special rules for enforcing this limited class of mediations would take
advantage of this fortuitous intersection between the greatest need for
enforcement and the least problematic setting for enforcement. Tak-
ing a page from the limited scope of the Model Law, this approach
could also blunt the effects of difficult decisions on mediation and
adjudication values.
One drawback to isolating international commercial mediations,
however, is that any rule that is limited to a specific category of media-
165 See, e.g., UNIF. MEDIATION ACT § 11(a) (4) (June 5, 2001 Annual Meeting
Draft), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bIl/ulc/ulc.htm#umediat. Note that
the proposal to require a special statement affirming the parties' desire for enforce-
ment would apply only to summary enforcement, not to enforcement via a contract
action. Requirements that run counter to community expectations, such as this, cre-
ate uncertainty and leave otherwise valid agreements unenforced if applied to all en-
forcement. SeeJames R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, The Haghighi 7ilogy and the
Minnesota Civil Mediation Act: Exposing a Phantom Menace Casting a Pall Over the Develop-
ment of ADR in Minnesota, 20 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 299, 323-24 (1999).
166 UNIF. MEDIATION ACT §11 (a) (3) (June 5, 2001 Annual Meeting Draft), available
at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ulc.htm#umediat.
167 See Craig A. McEwen et al., Bring in the Lawyers: Challenging the Dominant Ap-
proaches to Ensuring Fairness in Divorce Mediation, 79 MINN. L. REv. 1317 (1995) (discuss-
ing the "lawyer-participant" approach to mandated divorce mediation).
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tion creates definitional problems. There is always the potential for
surprise and/or litigation if parties do not realize their dispute falls
within the special rule. 168 This is a risk that was accepted, however, in
amending the UMA to provide confidentiality rules limited to interna-
tional commercial conciliations and it might be acceptable in the con-
text of summary enforcement as well. In addition, the risk of surprise
could be greatly reduced with safeguards that support awareness and
self-determination, such as requiring a lawyer.
Should it make a difference if the parties have been required to
participate in mediation or ordered to do so by a court? Perhaps it is
reasonable for parties to expect that the court will also provide proce-
dures to minimize the burden of enforcement litigation that can fol-
low from its mandate. But it seems equally reasonable for parties to
expect that the court will provide a fair procedure and a mechanism
for correcting the situation if the mediation does not live up to this
promise.
Some approaches to enforcement involve turning to arbitration.
One suggestion is that parties could agree to arbitrate, then mediate a
settlement prior to the arbitration and have it entered as an arbitral
award subject to normal enforcement procedures. 169 A shortcoming
to this procedure, however, is that entering into an agreement to arbi-
trate in advance of mediation is a risky course for a party that wants
only to mediate. If the mediation does not lead to a settlement, the
other party could enforce the agreement to arbitrate under the FAA
or the New York Convention. 70
An alternative suggestion is to mediate without an arbitration
agreement and then convert the mediated agreement to an arbitral
award to make it enforceable. There are some countries that provide
this mechanism domestically. In Argentina, for example, parties can
conditionally confer the powers of an arbitrator on their mediator. If
they are successful in mediation, the mediator-as-arbitrator then con-
verts their agreement into an award enforceable in Argentine
168 See van Ginkel, supra note 88, at 12, 17-18.
169 Some states provide this procedure by statute for international commercial me-
diations. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 684.10(2) (West 2003) ("If before a final award is
issued the parties agree to settle their dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall .... if re-
quested by the parties and accepted by the tribunal, record the agreed settlement in
the form of a final award."); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-567.60(b) (2003) ("If, during arbitral
proceedings, the parties settle their dispute, the arbitral tribunal shall ... if requested
by the parties and not objected to by the arbitral tribunal, record the settlement in
the form of an arbitral award on agreed terms.").
170 See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
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courts.171 In China, where arbitrators can conduct conciliations, the
outcome of a conciliation may be either a conciliation statement or an
arbitral award. Both have the same legal force and effect.' 72 It is an
open question, however, whether once a mediated agreement has
taken the form of an arbitral award it could be enforced internation-
ally under the New York Convention.1 73
In the absence of procedures for summary enforcement of a me-
diated agreement, adapting arbitral enforcement to mediation is a
pragmatic response. Unfortunately, an enforcement mechanism de-
signed to provide very limited review for neutral decisions may fail to
take into account infirmities in a bargaining setting that could make
an agreed solution unfair. Both awards and agreements draw their
authority from the consent of the parties, but with an important dif-
ference. With an award the parties consent to a process in which a
neutral intervenes to make a decision, whereas with an agreement
they consent directly to the outcome. Some courts have used lan-
guage that captures the significance of this distinction for the enforce-
ment of agreements:
[W]e recognize that settlement of claims is favored in the law....
and that mediated settlement as a means to resolve disputes should
be encouraged and afforded great deference . . . [but] given the
consensual nature of any settlement, a court cannot compel compli-
ance with terms not agreed upon or expressed by the parties in the
settlement agreement.' 74
171 Am. Bar Ass'n Task Force on Elec. Commerce & Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion & Shidler Ctr. for Law, Commerce and Tech., Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, Ad-
dressing Disputes in Electronic Commerce: Final Recommendations and Report, 58 Bus. LAw.
415, 456 (2002).
172 Model Law Draft Guide, supra note 12, at 25 (citing Arbitration Law of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China art. 51).
173 There is some uncertainty as to whether courts would treat a converted media-
tion agreement as governed by the New York Convention. The Convention applies to
awards "arising out of differences between persons, whether physical or legal." New
York Convention, supra note 128, art. I, 21 U.S.T. at 2519, 330 U.N.T.S at 39. When
the parties reach a mediated agreement before invoking arbitration, there is then
arguably no dispute and no "differences" to give rise to the arbitration. Another pos-
sible interpretation of the Convention, however, would avoid this barrier to enforce-
ment. The phrase "arising out of differences" allows some flexibility in how directly
the differences must lead to the award and could support enforcing an award arising
out of differences that were resolved via mediation. This interpretation would
broaden the application of enforcement provisions that were tailored for arbitration,
but would have the advantage of respecting the self-determination of the parties who
choose this approach.
174 Chappell v. Roth, 548 S.E.2d 499, 500 (N.C. 2001); see also Riner v. Newbraugh,
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The FAA arbitration enforcement provisions provide minimal re-
view of a neutral's decision under standards that were not designed
for establishing the bona tides of an alleged agreement by the par-
ties.1 75 Moreover, under international standards, the discrepancy be-
tween efficiency via summary court enforcement and fairness as
defined in terms of mediation values is potentially even greater. 76
Summary enforcement of mediated agreements based on an arbi-
tration model could also have undesirable consequences for adjudica-
tion values. In confirming arbitration awards, courts have shown great
tolerance for enforcing measures they have had no role in crafting.
There are tensions in this role, however, that have been exacerbated
by extending arbitration to statutory claims. Some of the stress frac-
tures are indicated by proposals for expanded judicial review of the
legal basis for awards177 and objections to arbitrations authorized by
adhesion agreements in consumer and employment settings. 178
Enforcing mediated agreements could further call courts' roles
into question. While arbitration of statutory issues can be justified as
the application of law in a different forum, mediation agreements may
bear no resemblance at all to what a court would decide. Self-determi-
nation allows parties to consider needs and interests that do not have
currency in the world of legally-cognizable categories. The corollary is
that they may ignore publicly-endorsed values expressed in legal doc-
563 S.E.2d 802, 809-10 (W. Va. 2002) (limiting enforcement to agreements that are
"fairly made and are not in contravention of some law or public policy").
175 The FAA does permit a court to vacate an award "procured by corruption,
fraud, or undue means." 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(1). Contract law, however, invalidates
agreements on additional grounds, such as duress and mistake, that are not a concern
in a decisional process.
176 Under the U.S. enabling legislation, the New York Convention dictates the ex-
clusive grounds for refusing to confirm an international award. See id. § 207 ("The
court shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral
of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in said Convention."); see also
Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 20 (2d Cir. 1997)
("There is now considerable caselaw holding that ... the grounds for relief enumer-
ated in Article V of the Convention are the only grounds available for setting aside an
arbitral award."); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr GmbH & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir.
1996) ("Article V of the Convention lists the exclusive grounds for justifying refusal to
recognize an arbitral award."). These grounds do not include fraud.
177 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Managerial Litigants? The Overlooked Problem of
Party Autonomy in Dispute Resolution, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 1199, 1205-06 (2000).
178 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforce-
ment of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L.
REV. 449, 452 (1996) (suggesting that the "use of executory arbitration agreements be
limited to those parties who share similar negotiating incentives").
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trine. 179 If arbitration-like enforcement procedures are applied to
mediated agreements between parties who have stepped outside "the
shadow of the law," there may be stark questions about the appropri-
ate enforcement role of the courts.
Many questions remain. Does the incidence of enforcement diffi-
cultiesjustify a summary procedure? Despite indications that much of
the mediation-related litigation centers on enforcing mediated agree-
ments, how does the frequency of such cases compare to the fre-
quency of mediation? Would parties elect an expedited procedure
often enough to make a difference in the frequency of such cases?
Even if widely chosen, some parties may argue that their acceptance of
the procedure was not informed or fair, thus creating another layer of
litigation about enforcement.
Would summary enforcement of mediated agreements make
sense in the broader context of settlement? It is not clear that the
participation of a mediator justifies enforcing a mediated settlement
in a different manner than a negotiated settlement. Perhaps both
processes should be eligible for summary enforcement if the parties so
desire. If requiring the participation of a lawyer would safeguard self-
determination in mediation, could it also do so in negotiation?
What effect would summary enforcement have on the role of the
mediator? Perhaps she would feel a greater responsibility to ensure a
just agreement if it were subject to summary enforcement. Should the
role of the mediator have an influence over the acceptability of sum-
mary enforcement? As part of the debate over the role of the media-
tor in ensuring justice, scholars have challenged the classically-defined
concept of mediator "neutrality."180 Would movement toward a more
interventionist role for mediators make summary enforcement of
agreements more acceptable?
My goal here has been to stimulate debate on the question of
summary enforcement. At our present state of knowledge about
problems enforcing mediated agreements, I am unconvinced that me-
diation necessarily needs to offer the finality associated with arbitra-
tion. I fear that incorporating such finality through summary
enforcement procedures might stretch the capabilities of mediation
in much the same way that extending arbitration to disputes based on
statutory rights has stretched arbitration beyond its comfort zone. But
179 See, e.g., Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice
Through Law, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 49 (1996) ("The promise of mediation is different:
Justice is derived, not through the operation of law, but through autonomy and self-
determination.").
180 See, e.g., Coben, supra note 46, at 73-74, 78-83 (citing scholarship).
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perhaps procedures for summary enforcement could be developed
that would not impair the characteristic attributes of mediation.
CONCLUSION
The world of courts and litigation is thoroughly intertwined with
the practice of mediation, both as a source of cases and as the ulti-
mate forum for resolving disputes that arise out of mediation. Con-
comitantly, mediation is integrated into the practice of law as a means
of settling litigation and, somewhat, as an independent process. All
three procedures I have discussed-the recent domestic uniform law,
the international model law, and potential enforcement mecha-
nisms-share the goal of making mediation more attractive and effec-
tive both when used independently and in the court-connected
context. This general goal, however, obscures the extent to which the
UMA and the Model Law are the products of compromises among
procedural values that characterize mediation and adjudication. Any
development of summary enforcement procedures for mediated
agreements would pose a new set of challenges for these values that
should be assessed with care. Seeking to strengthen mediation by
truncating the process of adjudicatory enforcement to a summary pro-
cedure could erode characteristics that help make mediation and ad-
judication valuable and effective.
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